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Abstract
This dissertation attempts unveil new information concerning intertemporal
choice, by trying to find a correlation between personality and the temporal choices that
people make. The methodology for doing so is as follows: a survey was distributed and
responses were regressed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Given that there were two
questions (one formatted using a calendar date and the other using a word format) about
intertemporal choice (subjects were asked to choose a certain payoff corresponding to a
specific point in time), there were two models constructed. Each model had the following
variable structure: the dependent variable was the expected payoff, while the independent
variables were gender, grade, and most importantly, the point total corresponding to the
questions about personality. The results of the regression were not statistically significant,
most likely majorly due to the smaller sample size of 204 observations as well as a
possible presence of a sample bias of college students; however, interesting coefficient
sign changes in gender and grade occurred between the two models. Furthermore, the
coefficient sign on both models for the point total variable was negative, showing that the
more self-interested someone is (according to a personality test), the more present-gain
oriented they seem to be. A repetition of the experiment on a grander scale will either
confirm or deny these variables’ role in deciding expected payoffs involving
intertemporal choices.

1 Introduction
Would you rather have $50 now, or $100 a month from now? Intertemporal
choice arises when people have to choose between two or more payoffs at different times.
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In other words, it is how people discount different payoffs when time changes.
Understanding time is crucial in order to grasp the concept of intertemporal choice.
Scientific American elucidates this through the “arrow of time”, a continuous linear
concept of time: “But whereas we spend our days passing freely through space in any
direction we wish (gravity and solid obstacles permitting), time pushes us along,
willingly or not, in a single predetermined direction: toward the future. This is the arrow
of time—life carries us from the past, through the present, and into the future” (What
Keeps Time Moving Forward? Blame it on the Big Bang, Matson, John). One way to
envision the disconnect between intertemporal choice is through the consumption puzzle
(the “puzzle” being that long-run consumption and short-run consumption have constant
and falling APC, respectively). In essence, this is a choice about utility: “a decision
maker needs to trade off the utility (or value) of one outcome that is temporally proximal
(typically intermediate) with another one that is temporally distant” (Soman et al., The
Psychology of Intertemporal Discounting: Why are Distant Events Valued Differently
from Proximal Ones, 2005).
Many approaches have been taken in order to attempt to discover reasons why
people can act irrationally when making temporal decisions, and to try to find why some
make more extreme decisions than others. There have been approaches from a vast
amount of fields, including psychology, economics, neuro-economics, and many others.
Furthermore, the extent of the methodology used in each experiment is even more
immense. Despite the differences, what each respective research project does conclude,
however, is that people do not always tend to act rationally when faced with making
temporal choices.
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Richard Thaler elaborates on the winner’s curse concept in his paper Anomalies:
The Winner’s Curse, where he mentions that “the winner’s curse cannot occur if all the
bidders are rational, so evidence of a winner’s curse in market settings would constitute
an anomaly” (Journal of economic Perspectives, Volume 2, Number 1, Winter 1988, p.
192). For those who are not familiar with the winner’s curse, the winner’s curse occurs
when the highest bidder for something is “cursed” in one of two ways: “(1) the winning
bid exceeds the value of the tract, so the firm loses money; or (2) the value of the tract is
less than the expert’s estimate so the winning firm is disappointed” (Thaler, p. 192). The
“key ingredient” for this, as Thaler says, “is the existence of a cognitive illusion, a mental
task that includes a substantial majority of subjects to make a systematic error” (Thaler, p.
201). Soman et al. (2005) believe something very similar: “because individuals are
myopic, they over-emphasize short-term benefits relative to long-term benefits” (p. 352).
One factor for these decisions can be found in Mitchell, Schirmer, Ames, and
Gilbert (2011). In their study, they conclude that, “people may tend to think of their
future selves not as they think of their present selves but as they think of other people”
(Medical Prefrontal Cortex Predicts Intertemporal Choice, Journal of Cognitive
Neurosciences 23:4, p. 1). This neurological approach was able to capture the difference
in brain activity in a specific region (ventro-medical pFC, vPMC) and relate it to
temporal choice.
Another factor can be found in a completely different approach. Dshemuchadse,
Scherbaum, and Goschke (2012) use a computerized approach to capture their findings.
By storing data in the computers used for testing (such as cursor movement, time lapse
for cursor movement, etc.), they observed, “less direct mouse movements when
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participants chose later/larger rewards, indicating that participants had to overcome the
attraction of the sooner/smaller reward first” (How Decisions Emerge: Action Dynamics
in Intertemporal Decision Making, Journal of Experimental Psychology, Vol 142, p. 93).
Furthermore, their findings led to the hypothesis that, “impulsivity forces people to
discount future rewards more steeply than rational choice models would prescribe” (p.
93).
One of the most common models for expected outcomes is the expected utility
theory model. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) disagreed with the validity of the expected
utility model, and created a new theoretical model: prospect theory. This new theory
differs from the expected utility theory mainly in that the weighting function is not a
matter of probability, but that of the impact of events on the desirability of prospects.
Both the expected utility model and the prospect theory model are best attempts at trying
to establish rational preferences in terms of outcomes.
That being said, a different theory, called present theory, is seemingly a better
predictor at sequential studies rather than a single-shot study. To illustrate this theory and
its implications, Rachlin (1990) uses a sports gambler: “a compulsive sports gambler, for
instance, bets on several games in a day and, according to present theory, resets accounts
after each win.” Therefore, even if said gambler lost one-hundred bets before he or she
won one bet, he or she would forget about those losses and use the fact of winning as
justification to continue betting.
Additionally, Wathieu (1997) constructs a discounted utility model under habit
formation. Habit formation means that, “the outcome in each period is evaluated in
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comparison with what the decision maker has been accustomed to.” Habit formation, as a
concept, is important to understand, as individuals have the ability to craft a habit of what
outcomes they would like to receive. As it turns out, Waithieu (1997) was able to relate
two anomalies to habit formation: “two major anomalies in intertemporal choice
(decreasing impatience and negative time preference) can be jointly explained and
viewed as intuitive properties of a single discounted utility model under habit formation.”
In other words , decreasing impatience and negative time preference can be explained
through habit formation, and therefore a discount utility model under habit formation
should take these variables into consideration.
One anomaly that has been growing in the discussion of intertemporal
choice is the “date/delay effect”. This “effect” occurs when people discount items
differently while looking at date forms of time versus delay forms of time (e.g. one year).
This effect has becoming more and more apparent in studies involving intertemporal
choice. One example is in Dshemuchadse, et al. (2012), where their results suggested,
“that a change in the weighting of the value information is a possible source of the datedelay effect.” By replicating previous findings, they found a “stronger temporal
discounting when the time intervals of the options were presented as delays rather than
calendar dates.” Additionally, Read, Frederick, Orsel, and Rahman (2005), take on the
task of identifying the date/delay effect in five different experiments. In all of the
experiments that Read et al. (2005) conducted, there was evidence of the existence of the
date/delay effect: “People exhibit less discounting when time intervals are described as
dates than when they are described as delays.” These aforementioned studies are only a
few that have touched upon this effect in academia. The existence and importance of this
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effect only illustrates more clearly that there is much to investigate and uncover in the
world of intertemporal choice.
Gilman, Curran, Calderon, Stoeckel, and Evins (2014) indicate that, “discounting
rates can be modulated by social influence.” In their study, Gilman et al. (2014) were able
to see that social influence can play a role when young adults make intertemporal choices.
Given that the majority of the subjects that will be surveyed are young adults (college
population), it is important to try to minimize this effect on in this survey. If this issue is
not addressed, one could run the risk of having faulty or skewed data. Individual and
original responses are crucially important. Unlike the other research analyzed for this
project, the method and goal of Curran et al. (2004) was unique, and could have
implications on past studies.
In addition to the date/delay effect, Magen, Dweck, and Gross (2008) uncover
that there might be another effect to consider: how the payoffs are formatted. In Magen et
al. (2008), the payoffs were listed in two forms: hidden-zero and explicit-zero. According
to their results, “the hidden-zero and explicit-zero formats of presentation were logically
equivalent, the latter resulted in lower rates of impulsive choice.” Magen et al. (2008)
attribute this to the possibility that the explicit-zero format might make the opportunity
cost more prevalent to those undergoing the experiment.
Also, it appears that temporal choice can be affected by gender: “men discounted
the future more after considering the appeal of pictures of pretty women . . . we believe
that this is the first demonstration of an experimentally induced change in human
discounting” (Wilson and Daly, 2004). Pictures of attractive women alone were enough
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to make men discount more than women did in a similar situation. Decisions regarding
temporal choice are seemingly multifaceted, which makes fully understanding the topic
even more difficult.
A slightly different approach was taken by Caruso, Van Boven, Chin, and Ward
(2012), where they tested subjects in virtual movement as well as traditional methods:
"some people had the (virtual) experience of moving forward in space, consistent with
their natural orientation of thoughts, whereas others had the (virtual) experience of
moving backward in space, reversing their natural orientation of thoughts." The reason
behind this study was that, “the future is psychologically closer than the past because the
future typically approaches the present whereas the past recedes from the present.” The
results of this experiment illustrated that, "people tended to report that times were
psychologically closer when their spatial movement corresponded with their
metaphorical temporal location" (Caruso et al. 2012). This reveals that human tendency is
to think of time as forward moving, rather than backwards moving.
Andrew Haldane, one of the Executive Directors at the Bank of England,
discusses the effect of impatience and short-termism on financial markets and society at
large: "Evidence from social and economic systems points to two evolutionary paths.
Along one, patience becomes self-reinforcing. For example, financial liberalization (the
deregulation of financial markets in a country) may encourage patience and improve
inter-temporal choice, unlocking growth. But there is a second path, along which
impatience is self-reinforcing. Financial liberalization can also unlock impatience,
generating over-trading and under-investment. These dual equilibria make choosing the
right pace and path of financial reform crucial" (Andrew Haldane: Patience and Finance).
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To illustrate this in terms of holding of US Equities, Haldane says the following: "In
1940, the mean duration of US equity holdings by investors was around 7 years. For the
next 35 years up until the mid-1970s, this average holding period was little changed. But
in the subsequent 35 years average holding periods have fallen secularly. By the time of
the stock market crash in 1987, the average duration of US equity holdings had fallen to
under 2 years. By the turn of the century, it had fallen below one year. By 2007, it was
around 7 months. Impatience is mounting" (Andrew Haldane: Patience and Finance).
Clearly, people have been continuing down a path of being impatient, and there is no
evidence that this trend will end. If it holds that people are becoming less patient, this
should also hold in any study questioning intertemporal choice if the results can be
compared to the same subjects in the past.
Furthermore, additional research reveals that individual risk attitudes can affect
intertemporal choice: "Reward neurons encode risk separately from value (see Schultz et
al. 2008). Prefrontal risk signals differ between risk avoiders and risk takers. Risk
reducers value signals in risk avoiders and increases value signals in risk takers. Thus,
individual risk attitudes may reflect variations of prefrontal function" (Brain Wave
Project, The Royal Society, pg. 62). This difference in risk attitudes lead to decisions that
have the possibility of not being the best possible choices for an individual: "We know
that certain reward values are coded 'inaccurately' in the brain. For example, we know
that the reward processes in the striatum tend to discount the values of future rewards
(temporal value discounting). This may be a factor that leads us to invest less in
provisions for the future (such as education, healthcare or pensions) than we 'should' do"
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(Brain Wave Project 1, The Royal Society, pg. 65). If different risk attitudes are the cause,
it would be reasonable to attempt to try and derive those attitudes from individuals.
One area of research that hasn't attracted much attention is how personality, if at
all, correlates to temporal choice. This paper will use the methodology that will be
discussed in the upcoming section in order to see if there is a relationship between
someone’s personality and his/her intertemporal choices. Knowing this information
(whether or not the results are significant) will arm the academic community with more
knowledge about this deep and complex subject.

	
  
2	
  Experiment	
  and	
  Hypothesis	
  
	
  

2.1	
  Theoretical	
  Analysis:	
  
	
  

	
  
The specific question that is trying to be answered is: Does personality have an

effect on an individuals intertemporal choices? Given that someone’s personality is
something that is unique to them, as well as something that can be in common between
people, I would suspect that there might be a relationship between personality and
intertemporal choice. Imagine this example. Joe Brown and Frank White both commute
from NJ to NYC for work every day and both choose to drive. One morning, there is
abysmal traffic congestion, which will make both Joe and Frank late to work. Joe throws
a huge fit, which wouldn't surprise people who know Joe (as he throws fits all the time),
while Frank remains calm. Many people would attribute this difference to personality:
Joe has a quick-tempered personality, while Frank has a calm personality. Given the
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relationship between someone’s natural tendencies and personality, hypothesizing that
personality might affect intertemporal choice is well within reason. Finding out if
personality has any impact on intertemporal choice will add to the bank of existing
knowledge to be used for future research.

2.2 Methodology:
Data for this experiment was gathered through a survey distribution, primarily to
current students at Pace University (in order to maximize survey responses). The survey
contains fourteen questions: two questions based on intertemporal choice, one question
regarding gender, one question regarding age, and ten questions which are taken from a
personality quiz from a third party. The questions regarding intertemporal choice asked
subjects to circle one of five choices, with each choice carrying a different value at a
different point in time. It is important to note that these two questions will have similar
traits. The first common trait is that the time distance between the answer choices will be
the same in both questions. Secondly, each answer will have the same percentage
increase in payoffs between each of the choices. For example, if there was a 10%
increases from choice a to b in question 1, the answer choices in question 2 would
increase 10% from a to b. There are a few differences between the two questions to note,
however. Firstly, question 1 is formatted as a calendar date delay, and the second is
formatted as a word delay (word delay meaning that delays are only stated using words).
Secondly, the beginning values for each question are different: question 1 starts with an
$8 payoff, while question 2 starts with a $10 payoff, and so forth. To be clear, the
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possible choices that were dated later carried a larger payoff comparative to choices that
were dated at an earlier time. Responses were collected via an online survey link, as well
as some responses via paper (for those who did not receive the online survey link). Each
answer choice to each question corresponds to a point value, which was then summed at
the very end. Based on the amount of points that a subject receives, he or she fell into six
different personality buckets. In order to give the reader a taste of how points measure to
personality, examples of the two extremes will follow. Firstly, on the low end of the
spectrum, under twenty-one points would show that, “people think you are shy, nervous,
and indecisive, someone who needs looking after, who always wants someone else to
make the decisions & who doesn't want to get involved with anyone or anything. They
see you as a worrier who always sees problems that don't exist. Some people think you're
boring. Only those who know you well know that you aren't”. On the high end of the
spectrum, over sixty points would show that, “Others see you as someone they should
‘handle with care’ You're seen as vain, self-centered, and who is extremely dominant”
Others may admire you, wishing they could be more like you, but don't always trust you,
hesitating to become too deeply involved with you”
(http://pastorpauley.com/counseling/personality_test.htm). All of the other buckets fall
within these point ranges. I will also note that gender will be represented as a dummy
variable, where an answer of 1 would indicate that the subject is female and an answer of
0 would indicate that the subject is male. Responses for surveys were collected and
entered into an excel spreadsheet. A copy of the survey is included in the appendix
section so a reader may become more familiar with its structure.
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OLS regression is used in order to analyze the aforementioned data set, using
STATA software. Given that this project is an attempt to investigate the possibility that a
correlation between personality and intertemporal choice might exist, my dependent
variable is the outcome (or payoff). Since my survey contains two different questions
regarding intertemporal choice, I constructed two separate models, one for each of the
questions. The independent variables is as follows: gender, age (1 if a college freshman, 2
if a college sophomore, 3 if a college junior, 4 if a college senior, and 5 if a college
gradaute), and the total amount of points an individual accrued based on their survey
responses. It is important to note that total amount of points is used rather than individual
personality buckets, as otherwise there would be six different dummy variables in the
data set to represent personality at the same time. Given that the structure of the
personality questions in the survey is to show the relationship of points to personality,
using the raw score will not weaken the link between personality and points. This secures
the position that using the point totals is a more appropriate approach. As described
above, my model tries to explain that gender, grade, and most importantly personality,
has an impact on one’s desired payoff at a period in time. Additionally, I believe a linear
form functional model would be best fit for this experiment. Due to the manageable size
and the hypothesized relationship of my numbers, it would not be necessary to use a log
form for any of the variables. Polynomial and inverse forms would be ruled out as well
for other reasons that are not necessary to explain.
Given that the background for my models has been explained in the previous
paragraphs, it is fitting that I describe the models themselves. For the first question
concerning intertemporal choice, the model is as follows:
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𝐼𝑇𝐶1 = 𝛽! +    𝛽! 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 +    𝛽! 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 +    𝛽! 𝑃𝑏𝑡 +   𝜖
where “itc1”1 is the payoff desired (from the first question responses), “grade”
is the grade that the respondent is in, “gender” is the gender of the respondent,
and “pbt” is the total amount of points that the respondent accrued, and 𝜖 is
the error term.
Similarly to the equation above, the model based off of the responses for the second
question is this:
𝐼𝑇𝐶2 = 𝛽! +    𝛽! 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 +    𝛽! 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 +    𝛽! 𝑃𝐵𝑇 +   𝜖
where “ic2” is the payoff desired (from the second question responses),
“grade” is the grade that the respondent is in, “gender” is the gender of the
respondent, and “pbt” is the total amount of points that the respondent
accrued, and 𝜖 is the error term.

2.3 Hypothesis
Overall, it is one’s hope that results are both in accordance to one’s
hypotheses and that the results are significant. It is important to note that given the
caliber of this experiment, comparative to the expected sample size, there is a
possibility that the results will not be significant due to an issue with the sample size
or sample bias. Therefore, if this is the case, this experiment and these results can be
viewed as a preliminary study of this issue.

2.3.1 Hypothesis of Grade
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I hypothesize that grade might have a smaller-scale effect on intertemporal
choice that works alongside personality in the following way: As grade increases,
especially when a person is a college graduate, they may be more inclined to choose
a higher payoff. I believe this because a combination of a college education and
work experience might allow for one to overcome the temptation of getting a lower
short-run gain in order to receive a larger long-run gain.

2.3.2 Hypothesis of Gender
In terms of gender, I hypothesize that women will have a higher payoff in
comparison to men. There have been many research studies done which have proven
that women are more patient than men (in a wide variety of areas), so I predict that
this would continue to hold in this experiment as well.

2.3.3 Hypothesis of Personality
Before I explain my hypothesis regarding personality, it is important to lay
down a fundamental hypothesis that I am making regarding the point system. Using
the explanation for the highest point bucket, I view this group as more present-gain
oriented compared to the other buckets. As one moves down towards the bottom,
they progressively get less self-present oriented. I hypothesize this based off of real
life experience: people I know who would fall into the highest bucket, racking up
the most points, tend to be impatient, while those who are lower on the spectrum are
not as impatient in comparison.
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Therefore, given my belief stated above, I predict that as someone’s total
point value increases, the payoff associated with said person would be smaller, and I
expect this to be true on both models. Accordingly, the expected sign of the
coefficient for “pbt” would be negative.

3 Results
Out of 209 responses, 5 were not completely filled out, and therefore were discarded.
Given that point total would therefore be inaccurate because of unanswered
questions, I did not include this information in the data set: the total amount of
observations was 204. According to Table 2 below, once can observe the summary
statistics for this experiment. Firstly, the means for both “itc1” and “itc2” lie in
between the third and fourth answer choices of each question. Secondly, the mean
for “grade” was 3.09, which shows that the mean grade was a junior. The frequency
distribution shown in Table 2 illustrates that a little under half of the subjects were
either a senior or graduate. Thirdly, given that the mean for gender was about .63,
there was a larger amount of female subjects who completed the survey. Last but not
least, the range of “pbt” illustrates that subjects fell within the middle-four
personality buckets, with a tendency to be located around the fourth bucket, on
average.
	
  

	
  

	
  

18	
  	
  

	
  
	
  

Table 1

	
  

Table	
  1

3.1 Analysis of Regression, Model 1
According to Table 3, the results of this regression were weak. The Rsquared was a meager .0011, meaning that .11% of the data can be explained with
my model. The Adjusted R-squared was at the same level, effectively 0%.
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Furthermore, the higher root MSE value is another indicator that this model is not
too accurate in terms of explaining the collected data.
Furthermore, none of the coefficients were significant, rather, seemingly far
off. Out of the significance of these coefficients, “grade” seemed to be the least
significant, with a t –value of 0.09 and a p-value of 0.930. “Pbt”, the main focus of
this experiment, was the most significant (out of all of the insignificant value) at a 0.37 t-value, and a 0.7111 p-value. Given the very low values of the t-values, it
proves unnecessary to perform a t-test to test for the significance of the coefficient:
the t-values of all variables would be much lower than the critical t-value and the pvalues are way higher than the 5% significance level.

Table	
  3
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In terms of coefficient signs, the coefficient for “grade” was positive,
indicating that as someone’s grade increased, his or her payoff would increase as
well. Also, the coefficient for “gender” was negative, which indicates that when
someone was a woman, the expected payoff decreased.
Lastly, the negative coefficient for “pbt” indicates that as the point total
increases, expected payoff would decrease. All of these reveal that my hypothesis
was correct, aside from the “gender” coefficient: I had predicted that men would
tend to discount more than women; however, in this model this was not the case.

Table	
  4

	
  
Table 4 illustrates the heteroskedasticity test for this model. As evidenced by the
heteroskedasticity test result, it is evident that this model does not suffer from
heteroskedasticity. This is because of the low Chi-squared value generated, and the
high Prob>Chi-squared result.
The results for this model are both surprising and somewhat comforting to
say the least. They are surprising in the sense that these results were not as
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significant as I was expecting, as well as the fact that gender played an opposite role
than I expected. The comfort is in the fact that my hypotheses about “grade” and
“pbt” were correct.

3.2 Analysis of Regression, Model 2
The regression of the second model yielded somewhat similar results. As can
be seen in Table 5, R-squared was barely higher than in model 1, at .0054. This
means that only .54% of the data can be explained by the model. Adjusted R-squared
was virtually 0% as well, and root MSE was higher than in model 1. Therefore, in
terms of overall significance, model 2 is no better than model 1.
In terms of the significance of the coefficients, values for every coefficient
were higher than in model 1, although still insignificant. The lowest t-value was,
again, “grade” at -0.16, and the highest was “pbt” at -0.66 with p-values of 0.873 and
0.507, respectively. As with model 1, due to the low value of the t-values, it is
unnecessary to perform t-tests as the t-critical will be larger than the reported t-value.
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Table	
  5	
  

In terms of the signs of coefficient values, this model produces very
drastically different results, besides the coefficient sign for “pbt”, which was
negative in both models, and, about twice the size in this model compared to the first.
The coefficient for “grade” changed from a negative sign in model 1 to a positive
sign in this model, and more than doubled in value as well. In this model, being
female does not decrease expected payoff as it did in model 1, but rather increases it.
In addition, the sign for grade completely reversed as well from a positive in
the last model to a negative value in this model. This would mean that in this case,
the increase in someone’s grade decreases the expected payoff. Again, I am faced
with a two-to-one split regarding my proposed hypothesis, but this time with a
different situation. I predicted that an increase in “grade” would increase expected
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payoff, yet in this model it does not. Secondly, I predicted that women would be less
likely to discount the payoffs, and therefore have an overall higher expected payoff.
In the last model I had to accept that my hypothesis did not hold, however, it does in
this model.

Table	
  6

Table 6 above shows that this model does not suffer from heteroskedasticity,
as the Chi-squared is effectively 0, and the Prob>Chi-squared is high at 0.9733.
Compared to the first model, this is more-strongly homoskedastic, however, the
importance lies with the fact that neither model suffers from heteroskedasticity.

3.3 Relating the Two Models
The results from model 2’s regression were drastically different in terms of
coefficient signs and meanings, and lead to some puzzling questions; a reason must
exist to explain why the models differed as drastically as they did. The most difficult
question to answer is as follows: Why were there changes in coefficient signs?
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In their experiment, and as mentioned earlier in this paper, Read et al. (2005)
discovered a new anomaly in temporal discounting: “discount rates that are imputed
when time is described using calendar dates are markedly lower than those revealed
when future outcomes are described in terms of the corresponding delay.” In other
words, people tended to discount future outcomes more if they were laid out in a
word format. Now, remember a difference between question 1 and question 2 in the
survey: one question was based around a calendar date format, while the other was
based off of a word format (question 1 was the calendar date and question 2 was the
word format). Given the results of my own experiment, it seemed as though “grade”
was impacted by the change of format; however, “gender” was not. This raises major
implications for the “date/delay effect”, the name that Read et al. (2005) have
dubbed for this anomaly. It appears as though women are excluded from this effect.
As it turns out, out of 26 women who changed their respective choices from question
1 to question 2, 15 of them chose a higher payoff rather than the 11 who chose lower.
Clearly, when asked questions in word format rather than a calendar format, women
seem to tend to increase their expected payoffs, not discount them more.
Using these grounds in the previous paragraph, we could allude to the fact
that both “grade” and “pbt” were affected by the date/delay effect, as their
coefficient sign turned negative if it wasn't already (the case for “gender”) while the
value of the coefficient increased. Discounting of payoffs seem to increase in both
“grade” and “pbt” as word format is introduced, which conforms to the theory
presented in Read et al. (2005).
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Providing that personality is the main focus of this paper, the results of the
regression are something worth explaining in further detail. As mentioned earlier,
the t-values for “pbt” in both experiments were low, and therefore statistically
insignificant. In terms of the coefficient signs for pbt, the negative value indicates
that there is a negative correlation to expected payoff as the total point value
increases for an individual. Therefore, the more present-gain someone is as defined
by personality, the more he or she would discount a payoff.
The reasons for explaining why the model, as well as the individual
coefficients, were statistically insignificant is two-fold: it can either be attributed to
issues with the experiment, or to the theory that personality does not, in fact, affect
someone’s expected payoff. Given the design of this experiment, there could have
been fundamental issues that affected the results. First, and most importantly, I
believe the number of observations was too low in order to accurately account for a
normal distribution. Furthermore, given that this experiment was completed at an
undergraduate institution, the vast majority of participants in the survey were from
the university: a sample bias might have played a role in these results. Also, given
that the overwhelming majority of university students do not currently, or have not
had (for a longer period of time) a full-time job, some values that constituted as
payoffs might have seem inflated. In other words, a payoff of $140 might have
appeared as a much larger sum of money to an undergrad without a full-time job. If
this bias were present, it would definitively have implications on the data used in the
experimnent.
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It is also reasonable to possibly conclude that these models might have
suffered from omitted variable bias. With only three dependent variables, it is hard
to think that these are the only three factors that would affect the expected payoff.
Omitting variables that would be important in these models have immeasurable
effect, in the sense that it cannot be determined if the effects will be very grand or
minimal. Some examples of other variables that could have (and most likely should
have) been included are the following: a scale to measure a person’s risk aversion,
their current major in university (if they are still a student) or what their major was
when they attended university, and if the subject currently has investments, and if so,
what type (stocks, bonds, etc.).
Another approach to the interpreting the results is the theory that personality
does not affect someone’s intertemporal choices. By the coefficient not being
significant, it would illustrate that people choose a specific payoff at a specific point
in time for reasons other than personality. In order to confirm that this is the proper
approach, one would have to duplicate this experiment, and use a much larger
sample size (among other things). If the coefficient would still remain insignificant,
it would more strongly affirm that someone’s personality does not affect
intertemporal choices.
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4 Conclusion and Recommendations
4.1 Conclusion
The study of intertemporal choice is complicated and vast. Personality,
theoretically, should play a role in affecting intertemporal choices, as personality is
tasked with describing how someone truly is. Therefore, probing for a statistical
relationship between these is well within a scope of rationality.
To recap, the main purpose of this paper was to attempt to prove that a
correlation between personality and intertemporal choice exists. Although both of
the full models are not statistically significant, there are many implications of the
results.
One implication is through the role of the coefficient signs. As hypothesized,
and occurring in both models, the coefficient on “pbt” was negative, suggesting that
as the total point value increases, this would suggest that someone is more presentgain oriented, and has a higher discount rate. Using the scale of reference in the
survey, the higher the point total the more vain someone is. Therefore, as vainness
increases in a person, so does said person’s discount rate. Furthermore, the
coefficient signs for both “gender” and “grade” reversed in model 2 compared with
model 1. The only main structural difference between the two questions was their
format: the question for model 1 was formatted as a calendar date, while the question
for model 2 was formatted as a word structure. Using the theory of the “date/delay
effect” in Read et al. (2005), it is evident that this effect affected the “grade” variable
(as its coefficient sign switched to negative), while the “gender” coefficient changed
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from a negative sign to a positive sign with the change of format. Therefore, it
appears as if women tend to discount less when faced with payoffs in a word format,
the opposite of what Read et al. (2005) claimed the “date/delay effect” would do.
This is interesting, as it seems to put many other research findings in question. As
previously mentioned, many findings have suggested that women tend to have a
smaller discounting rate, showing the tendency that they are willing to wait longer
for a higher payoff compared with men. However, given the change in the
coefficient sign between the two models, it appears that this prediction does not hold
in this experiment. This could have many implications on past and future research,
as the formatting of the questions might play a much larger role than was previously
imagined.
Overall, the results of this experiment reveal many anomalies about
intertemporal discounting, and more widely, the field of behavioral economics. This
paper serves as a preliminary study, in order to pave the way for a more (hopefully)
successful replication. In addition to providing a basis for replication, this paper also
highlighted the aforementioned anomalies, which should be taken into consideration
when doing further research in this field. It would also be interesting to see if
repeating past experiments while taking some of the factors of this experiment into
consideration would change the results. As the great Albert Einstein once said, “If
you can’t explain it simply, you don’t understand it well enough.” Even though we
currently understand a sufficient amount about the nature of intertemporal choice,
we are far away from grasping it fully. It is only through replications of studies to
affirm our findings, and through the application of new ideas and theories will we
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come to understand more about this topic as an academic community. For all we
know, there might not be a way to explain it simply, or there might, in fact, be no
way to predict people’s choices at all.

4.2 Recommendations
If this experiment were to be replicated, there are some changes that could be
made to make it more effective and accurate. The first change would be to
drastically increase the sample size, and to increase the scope of subjects. As is, 204
observations, mainly from students at a university, are not sufficient enough to
represent a normal distribution: sample bias might be in order. Therefore, adding a
much larger amount of observations, and comparing those results with those of this
experiment would solve this issue. If the results now indicated that the coefficients
were statistically significant, in addition to the model being a strong fit, one could
come to the conclusion that personality, along with gender and grade, do play a role
in someone’s intertemporal choice. However, if the results still indicated that there
was no statistical significance in the model or any of the coefficients, it would be
hard to argue that personality plays a role in someone’s intertemporal choices
(assuming that there would be no other errors that would invalidate the results).
Additionally, adding variables, as well as making some questions more
specific would help as well. One example of this would be to substitute a grade in
university with different age buckets, or solely using a number value for age. By
doing this, the researcher could possibly address a fundamental issue with the
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method of collecting age in this experiment. This is just one example of adding a
variable, but there are many other variables that could play a pivotal role in
improving the overall quality of these models.
Furthermore, another approach to possibly take is to make the payoffs
realistic for subjects. In other words, test subjects would receive a check for
whatever choice they made (at whatever date that payoff would correspond to).
Making the payoffs real for test subjects is very popular among experiments
concerning intertempotal choice. This is because researchers believe that someone’s
true decision will emerge if they are realistically inserted into the situation, rather
than just answering without consequence. One way to test if there is a difference
would be to question the same group of people in two different experiments, one via
a paper survey with no real payout, and another with a real payout. We look forward
to further research of the topic to clarify the relationship between personality and the
time preference pay out.
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Appendix
Survey
1. Which option would you prefer? (Reference point for start date would be today)
a) $8 now
b) $12 on 12-31-2014
c) $49 on 11-4-2015
d) $110 on 1-27-16
e) $140 on 3-15-16
2. Are you Male or Female? (Circle One).
3. Are you a Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, Senior, or a College Graduate? (Circle
One).
4. When do you feel your best?
a) in the morning
b) during the afternoon & and early evening
c) late at night
5. You usually walk
a) fairly fast, with long steps
b) fairly fast, with little steps
c) less fast head up, looking the world in the face
d) less fast, head down
e) very slowly
6. When talking to people you
a) stand with your arms folded
b) have your hands clasped
c) have one or both your hands on your hips
d) touch or push the person to whom you are talking
e) play with your ear, touch your chin, or smooth your hair
7. When relaxing, you sit with
a) your knees bent with your legs neatly side by side
b) your legs crossed
c) your legs stretched out or straight
d) one leg curled under you
8. When something really amuses you, you react with
a) a big, appreciative laugh
b) a laugh, but not a loud one
c) a quiet chuckle
d) a sheepish smile
9. When you go to a party or social gathering; Do you...
a) make a loud entrance so everyone notices you
b) make a quiet entrance, looking around for someone you know
c) make the quietest entrance, trying to stay unnoticed
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10. You're working very hard, concentrating hard, and you're interrupted; Do you...
a) welcome the break
b) feel extremely irritated
c) vary between these two extremes
11. Which of the following colors do you like most?
a) red or orange
b) black
c) yellow or light blue
d) green
e) dark blue or purple
f) white
g) brown or gray
12. When you are in bed at night, in those last few moments before going to sleep,
you lie
a) stretched out on your back
b) stretched out face down on your stomach
c) on your side, slightly curled
d) with your head on one arm
e) with your head under the covers
13. You often dream that you are
a) falling
b) fighting or struggling
c) searching for something or somebody
d) flying or floating
e) you usually have dreamless sleep
f) your dreams are always pleasant
14. Which option would you prefer?
a) $10.00 now
b) $15.00 two and a half months from now
c) $51.25 a year from now
d) $127.50 a year and four months from now
e) $165.00 a year and a half from now

Point System and Personality Buckets
It is important to note that number 1-10 does not correlate to questions
1-10 in the survey above, but rather the ten questions about personality.
In the survey above, they are questions*

	
  

	
  

33	
  	
  

POINTS:
1. (a) 2 (b) 4 (c) 6
2. (a) 6 (b) 4 (c) 7 (d) 2 (e) 1
3. (a) 4 (b) 2 (c) 5 (d) 7 (e) 6
4. (a) 4 (b) 6 (c) 2 (d) 1
5. (a) 6 (b) 4 (c) 3 (d) 5 (e) 2
6. (a) 6 (b) 4 (c) 2
7. (a) 6 (b) 2 (c) 4
8. (a) 6 (b) 7 (c) 5 (d) 4 (e) 3 (f) 2 (g) 1
9. (a) 7 (b) 6 (c) 4 (d) 2 (e) 1
10. (a) 4 (b) 2 (c) 3 (d) 5 (e) 6 (f) 1
Now add up the total number of points.
OVER 60 POINTS: Others see you as someone they should "handle with care" You're seen as vain, selfcentered, and who is extremely dominant. Others may admire you, wishing they could be more like you,
but don't always trust you, hesitating to become too deeply involved with you.

51 TO 60 POINTS: Others see you as an exciting, highly volatile, rather impulsive personality; a natural
leader, who's quick to make decisions, though not always the right ones. They see you as bold and
adventuresome, someone who will try anything once; someone who takes chances and enjoys an adventure.
They enjoy being in your company because of the excitement you radiate.

41 TO 50 POINTS: Others see you as fresh, lively, charming, amusing, practical, and always interesting;
someone who's constantly in the center of attention, but sufficiently well-balanced not to let it go to their
head. They also see you as kind, considerate, and understanding; someone who'll always cheer them up and
help them out.

31 TO 40 POINTS: Others see you as sensible, cautious, careful & practical. They see you as clever,
gifted, or talented, but modest ... Not a person who makes friends too quickly or easily, but someone who's
extremely loyal to friends you do make and who expect the same loyalty in return. Those who really get to
know you realize it takes a lot to shake your trust in your friends, but equally that it takes you a long time to
get over it if that trust is ever broken.
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21 TO 30 POINTS: Your friends see you as painstaking and fussy. They see you as very cautious,
extremely careful, a slow and steady plodder. It'd really surprise them if you ever did something
impulsively or on the spur of the moment, expecting you to examine everything carefully from every angle
and then, usually decide against it. They think this reaction is caused
partly by your careful nature.

UNDER 21 POINTS: People think you are shy, nervous, and indecisive, someone who needs looking
after, who always wants someone else to make the decisions & who doesn't want to get involved with
anyone or anything. They see you as a worrier who always sees problems that don't exist. Some people
think you're boring. Only those who know you well know that you aren't.
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